

VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNO #0434/01 3251846
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201846Z NOV 08
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2479
INFO RUEHDX/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV IMMEDIATE 0168
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 6199
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI IMMEDIATE 5697
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0862
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE IMMEDIATE 0536
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/USNMR SHAPE BE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000434

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2018
TAGS: [PREL](#) [MARR](#) [NATO](#) [MOPS](#) [PREF](#) [RU](#) [UP](#)
SUBJECT: UKRAINIAN FM TO NATO - GIVE US MAP OR RUSSIA WINS

Classified By: Ambassador Kurt Volker
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

11. (C) Summary: Ukrainian FM Ogryzko briefed the NATO-Ukraine Commission on November 19. He called on Allies to provide the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to his country in order to strengthen the forces of democracy in Ukraine, and dissuade Russia from further destabilizing actions. Some Allied PermReps said they were in favor of giving MAP to Ukraine, while some said better performance would be necessary before such a step could be taken. However a majority chose to remain silent on the issue. End Summary.

It's Not About MAP for Ukraine.
It's About The Future Direction of the Whole Region

12. (C) Ukrainian Foreign Minister Volodymyr Ogryzko briefed the NATO Ukraine Commission on November 19, as part of Alliance preparations for the December 2-3 Foreign Ministerial. He recalled Allied consensus at the Bucharest Summit that Ukraine would become a member of NATO and outlined the characteristics of what he said had been a broadening and deepening of the Ukraine-NATO relationship since the April Summit. Ogryzko noted more than 20 high level consultations had taken place between Ukrainian officials and NATO. He also highlighted the series of Deputy-Minister level meetings on Ukraine's efforts to promote regional stability that took place in the months after the Russian incursion into Georgia in August. Ogryzko underlined Ukraine's ongoing commitment to deepening its relationship with NATO, illustrating his case by reference to his country's increasing troop contributions to NATO operations.

13. (C) Turning to the issue of NATO's December ministerial meeting, at which ministers will fulfill the Bucharest Declaration's mandate to make a "first assessment" on Ukraine's eligibility for MAP, the Foreign Minister said Ukraine's political commitment to getting MAP remained strong. Implicitly acknowledging Allied division on the issue, he also asked if MAP was truly the only path to membership, noting that Ukraine's ongoing participation in an Annual Target Plan over many years was very similar to the MAP process.

¶4. (C) In a measured but emotionally-tinged address, Ogryzko declared that the Alliance decision in December would not be about MAP, it would in reality be about peace and security in eastern Europe. He asserted that NATO's decision in December would represent an opportunity for a soft power response to Russia's aggressive tendencies. Ogryzko questioned why certain Allies "so stubbornly oppose peace, security, and democracy to the east" and asked if it would be in their strategic interest for Ukraine to fall back into an aggressive empire that threatened the West. He said that a "no" from the Alliance in December would leave the world in no doubt that Russia held a veto over NATO enlargement. He asked Allies to help his country help itself, drawing direct parallels between Ukraine's needs and the democracy assistance provided to Germany in the aftermath of the Second World War. He cautioned that appeasement in the not so distant past had led to the death of millions, noting that collective security arrangements had also been popular during that era. He closed by appealing for a step by the Alliance in December that would be a positive move for both Ukraine and NATO, arguing that a failure to do so would only lead to a popping of champagne corks in Moscow.

Allies generally supportive,
but quietly divided on the details of such support

¶4. (C) Allied interventions featured repeated themes. While many Allies argued for the need to depoliticize the issues of MAP and eventual membership, PermReps agreed that that deep and significant further reforms would be necessary before Ukraine was ready to join the Alliance. The Netherlands, Hungary, Belgium, and Italy underlined their concern over the low levels of public support for NATO in Ukraine, while Turkey joined the Netherlands in calling for more effective defense reform.

¶5. (C) France spoke in favor of Ukraine's Euro Atlantic ambitions, while explicitly leaving the issue of MAP to ministers in December. The Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, Canada, Estonia, and Romania all expressed support for providing MAP in December. Responding to the Ogryzko's question, the UK and Canada pointed out that it was an historical fact that MAP was not the only possible path to membership. UK PermRep Eldon said he hoped Ukraine would be able to get a useful and unified result in December. Slovakia, Netherlands, Turkey, Hungary, Spain, Slovenia, dodged the issue in their interventions, and made no mention of MAP at all.

¶6. (C) Some PermReps took a dim view of Ogryzko's open belief that Germany has been a barrier to the deepening of Ukraine's relationship with NATO. Underling that NATO is a consensus-based organization, the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal expressed disappointment at such an approach and suggested it was indicative of a lack of the political maturity necessary to join the Alliance.

¶7. (C) German PermRep Brandenburg praised Ukraine for its use of the NATO partnership instruments, and for its contributions to NATO's operations. He acknowledged that Ukraine had made a serious effort towards reform, but raised German concerns about political use of the courts in Ukraine, and the low level of public support for NATO membership. Brandenburg promised Germany would continue its role as the largest European supporter of Ukraine's reform efforts. He acknowledged that the Bucharest Declaration's promise of membership remained valid but, referencing the NATO's 1995 Enlargement Study, added that the criteria for such membership were also clear) that enlargement of NATO must contribute to European security as a whole. Brandenburg encouraged Ogryzko to engage in proper expectations management in the run up to the December ministerial.

¶8. (C) Ambassador Volker agreed that Allied solidarity in meetings was important, but welcomed Ogryzko's clear, direct

and focused expression of the Ukrainian position. He hoped that Ogryzko could see that the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine were important to all the Allies. Volker underlined that the question of Ukraine's future membership in the Alliance was not in doubt, the real issue would be how NATO chose to help Ukraine get there. The Ambassador underlined that MAP had developed an inappropriate political significance and needed demystification. He called on all to ensure that the December ministerial would make it clear that Russia had not been successful in its attempts to draw a dividing line across Europe, and that NATO's enlargement process and work with Ukraine would continue unabated.

Please Help Ukraine, or Listen to Moscow's
Champagne Corks in December

19. (C) Ogryzko summed up Allied comment by saying that criticism fell into three categories: internal instability, insufficient public support, and insufficient domestic reforms. (Note: this implied to some that a negative decision from the Alliance in December would impede progress in these areas. End note). He made a special effort to placate Germany, including by citing in German his fondness for the country. Ogryzko repeated that Russia's main objective on the international stage has been to destabilize the process of NATO and EU integration. He said Moscow had done so because the Kremlin did not want the Russian people to see successful alternatives to the current style of Russian government. The Foreign Minister said that the relationship with NATO and the West was, simply put, the question of Ukraine's existence. Events in Georgia had already shown what could happen in Crimea. Ogryzko explicitly cited the Medvedev statement that Russia feels entitled to areas of special interest in other independent and sovereign countries. In closing, Ogryzko hoped that ministers in December could find an acceptable solution for both Ukraine and for NATO. He asked Allies to take a decision to promote more democratic and "more human" government, and "not forget about Ukraine."
VOLKER